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A Symbol - A Guaranty That the Development and Conservation of Our Nation's Resources Will Keep Pace

The Pelton Decision:
A Symbol-

A Guaranty

That the Development and Conservation of Our Nation's
Resources Will Keep Pace With Our National Demands
William H. Veeder*
This consideration is directed to the Pelton decision,1 and the historic
precedents it reaffirmed. Included are references to some of the attacks
which have been made against the principles set forth in Pelton. Existing
unrestrained federal programs demonstrate the indispensable nature of
the precepts express and inherent in the Pelton decision. For example:
1. As owner of the lands which the sources of the major
streams of Western United States, the national government
must take the lead in the conservation of the Winters Doctrine
Rights to the use of the waters of those streams and must resist2
every effort to make them available for private acquisition.
2. The United States must continue the struggle against the
ever-growing land and water monopolies which stultify the
economies where they are found.
3. The national government must proceed with present plans
and formulate new ones for basin development to meet the demands of an expanding economy that to a marked degree is
dependent upon the use of our water resources.
Long-range plans now being effectuated will enable this country to
sensibly utilize and to conserve its water resources in accord with the
needs of a rapidly expanding population. Widely disparate, but basically interdependent activities embracing large segments of Western
United States are involved. The success of those plans requires that the
federal government have the power to implement them, as well as to lead
state and local authorities in the proper development of water resources.
Therein lies the importance of the Pelton decision and the concepts which
it so clearly enunciates.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS OF PELTON
From the background of the Pelton decision come the objectives sought
"L.L.B., University of Montana School of Law, 1934. While Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, Mr. Veeder either personally tried or participated in the controversial cases referred to in this article, including that giving rise to the Pelton
decision, in which there was espoused the demand for the freedom of the federal
government in the development, use and administration of the nation 's water
resources.
The views expressed herein are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Department of Justice or any other agency or department of the federal
government.
'FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). (Hereafter referred to as the Pelton decision.)
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when the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. In this connection,
the express language and the general tenor of the opinion of the court
of appeals is important.3 If this opinion had not been reversed, it would
have constituted a devastating blow to the programs of the national government in the entire field of natural resources.
The primary question in Pelton was: whether a private power company, which had received a federal license to build the Pelton Dam across
the Deschutes River upon reserved lands of the United States, was also
required to secure approval from Oregon as a condition to constructing
the project. When the Federal Power Commission rejected the state's
contention, Oregon petitioned the court of appeals to reverse the Commission, which it did, declaring: "[It is] our opinion that the Commission has trenched upon the sovereignty of the state of Oregon .... The
fundamental principle. . . .is that Oregon has the right to regulate its
own waters in its chosen way."
The crux of the Pelton decision of the court of appeals was stated in
this sentence: "We proceed to the question of the sovereign power over
the waters of the Deschutes River."' 4 In analyzing the question, Judge
Stephens reviewed in detail the inherent weaknesses of the riparian doctrine respecting rights to the use of water in the arid and semiarid west. 5
He concluded that to overcome those weaknesses, "Congress provided the
remedy by separating the title to the [public] land from the right to the
control of the water and allowed the states, within which such waters
flowed, to regulate them. Acts of Congress of 1866, 1870, and the Desert
Land Act of 1877."6 That conclusion was drawn largely from the California Oregon Power Company decision.7
2

See Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights, 26 MONT. L. REv. 149 (1965): A basic principle
of the Winters Doctrine is "that although not mentioned in the treaties, executive
orders or other means used to establish the reservations, there is an implied reservation of rights to the use of the waters in streams which rise upon, traverse or border
upon Indian reservations, which may be exercised in connection with the Indian
lands. Those rights to the use of water are withheld from appropriation by others
subsequent to their reservation."
It is important to bear in mind the meaning of the following terms: 1. "Public
domain" is the term used in regard to all of the lands of the United States, including
both "public lands" and "reserved lands." 2. "Public lands" have been defined
as being "unqualifiedly subject to sale and disposition" (Pelton, 349 U.S. 435, 449).
3. "Reserved lands" have been referred to as follows: "It is a familiar principle
of public land law that statutes providing generally for disposal of the public domain
are inapplicable to lands which are not unqualifiedly subject to sale and disposition
because they have been appropriated to some other purpose."
U.S. v. O'Donnell,
303 U.S. 501, 510 (1938).
3
Oregon v. FPC, 211 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1954).
'Id. at 352, 354.
5
Riparian rights attach only to lands (1) which are contiguous to or abut upon the
stream, (2) only to the smallest tract held under one chain of title, (3) within the
watershed of the stream. [Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal.2d 501, 81 P.2d
533 (1938.)]
"Supra note 3, at 353; 19 Stat. 377 (1877), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1965).
That act having authorized entry upon desert lands of the United States of America,
requiring a declaration under oath that the entryman "intends to reclaim a tract of
desert land" provided:
That the right to the use of water. . .shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation;
• . .and all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together
with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of supply upon the public lands
and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of
the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.

Judge Stephens quoted from that case
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/3
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The court of appeals in the Pelton case proceeded on the basis that
the rights of the national government, in the field of water resources, had
been subverted to the control of the states. All doubt as to the correctness
of that conclusion is removed by this additional statement:
[T]he cession [by the Act of 1877] was a surrender of all regulatory
power over such waters and was not limited to their use in irrigation.
Whatever, if any, limitation there was on Oregon's complete sovereignty over the waters of the Deschutes River, was wiped out by
the Desert Land Act of 1877.
The court of appeals then concluded: "the Commission. . .has exceeded
its legal jurisdiction in that the ownership of the power dam site does
not empower the United States government to use the waters of the
Deschutes River either at the site of the power dam or elsewhere, contrary to Oregon state law. . .. ,,8
Judge Healy's strong dissent lent great strength to the petition for
a writ of certiorari. In sharply criticising the majority for its interpretation of the Acts of 1866, 1870, and the Desert Land Act of 1877, he said:
In my opinion the reliance is wholly misplaced. As is apparent from
their wording, these statutes have reference only to stream and other
bodies of water on the public lands, that is, lands subject to entry or
mode of acquisition under the public 9land laws. They have no application to waters on reserved lands.
It is impossible to imagine a factual statement which would bring
the Pelton Dam case more clearly within the purview of the Winters Doctrine.10 Yet the majority of the court of appeals sought to avoid the impact of that decision by this most unusual footnote: "We here treat the
As the owner of the public domain, the government possessed the power to dispose
of land and water thereon together, or to dispose of them separately. Howell v. Johnson.
C.C.. 89 Fed. 556. 558. The fair construction of [the Desert Land Act of 1877] is that
Congress intended to establish the rule that for the future the land should be patented
separately: and that all non-navigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use
of the public under the laws of the states and territories named. . .. What we hold is
that following the Act of 1877. if not before, all non navigable waters then a part of
the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated
states....

211 F.2d 347, 353; California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935). (Hereafter referred to as the California Oregon Power
Company decision.)

'Supra note 3, at 354.
1d. at 355.
1In connection with Judge Healy's dissent, reference is made to the fact that on June
25, 1855, a treaty was entered into between the United States and the Confederated
Tribes of Indians in middle Oregon. (12 Stat. 963). Retained by the Indians in their
treaty was an area the description of which commences "in the middle of the channel
of the De Chutes River."
That clause brings the Pelton case squarely within the
principles of Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Moreover by related
provisions of the treaty the eastern boundary of the reservation was established as
"the middle of the channel of said [De Chutes] river." (12 Stat. 964). This statement paraphrasing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905), emphasizes
the fact, ''When considering the nature of the grant under consideration, we must not
forget that it was not a grant to the Indians, but was one from them to the United
States, and all rights not specifically granted were reserved to them." United States
v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 911 (E.D. Idaho 1928). Consonant with the principles that
by the treaty the Indians retained title to that which they did not cede is this
provision of the treaty in question: "the exclusive right of taking fish in the
streams running through and bordering said reservation is hereby secured to said
Indians."
(12 Stat. 964). Respecting the treaty, Oregon's highest court has declared
it to be "Ibinding upon Oregon'' as the law of the land. Anthony v. Veatch, 189
Ore. 462, 220 P.2d 493, 502-03, 221 P.2d 575 (1950).
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Indian lands as United States lands since, in the absence of treaty or
special Act of Congress to the contrary, the fee title to Indian lands is in
the United States, subject to their use and occupancy by the Indians.""
Having stated the general principle of constitutional law that a state
may not exercise a "veto" power 12 over the will of Congress, the Supreme
Court in the Pelton decision reversed the opinion of the court of appeals
in these terms: "the Acts of July 26, 1866, July 9, 1870, and the Desert
Land Act of 187713. . .are not applicable to the reserved lands and waters
here involved.' 1 4 The Court then proceeded to distinguish between the
Indian lands and withdrawn lands, upon which the Pelton project was to
be located, and "public lands" to which the Desert Land Act of 1877 is
applicable, by stating that the former "are not unqualifiedly subject to
sale and disposition. ..."15
Despite adverse comment in some legal periodicals,1 6 the Pelton decision is now a deeply rooted precedent. It is accepted along with Winters as part of the fundamental law upon which national programs of water
17
conservation and utilization are formulated.
CALIFORNIA OREGON POWER COMPANY DECISION
DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PELTON CASE
A focal point of attack on Pelton is that in some manner it conflicts
with the California Oregon Power Company decision.' 8 The rationale of
this attack upon Pelton was stated by Oregon in its briefs to the Supreme
Court which relied upon the California Oregon Power Company and the
later Supreme Court case Ickes v. Fox.'9 Ickes v. Fox simply reiterated
the precepts enunciated by the earlier decision 20 and the general principles of the Colorado Doctrine, subsequently to be reviewed.
Oregon argued in these terms:
"Supra note 3, at 351 n. 9.
"Supra note 1, at 445.
"Supra note 6.
I'Supra note 1, at 447-49.
"Id. at 448.
1
Note, Federal Water Rights Legislation and the Reserved Lands Controversy, 53 GzO.
L.J. 750, 752 (1965). (Hereafter referred to as Federal Water Rights Legislation.)
17RiFKIND, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER,
Arizona v. California, 293 (1961).
"See Federal Water Rights Legislation, supra note 16; Munro, The Pelton Dec'ision:
A New Riparianism, 36 ORE. L. Rrv. 221, 240, 243 (1957).
1300 U.S. 82, 95 (1937). Whatever significance Ickes v. Fox has today is of no
importance here except that it is frequently seized upon by those who attack Pelton
as a basis for their conclusions. To cast the case of Ickes v. Fox in its proper perspective it should be considered in the light of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 702 n. 26 (1949). Involved in Ickes was the question
of whether the United States needed to be joined as an indispensable party to a
proceeding involving an alleged invasion by the Secretary of the Interior of rights
which had been acquired pursuant to state law and had been long exercised. Having
vested, those rights were entitled to the same protection as other property interests.
In the decree concluding major conflicts upon the Yakima River the vested rights
were fully recognized. More important, however, is the fact that the best right on
the river was awarded to the Yakima Indians, thus taking cognizance of the basic
and fundamental precepts that a Winters Doctrine Right will take precedence over
the rights allegedly invaded in the case of Ickes v. Fox.
2Brief for Respondents, p. 22 et seq., FPC v. Oregon, supra note 1.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/3
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The only true ownership in water is one of a right to use. Neither
the United States nor any individual state can possess a true title
unless and until a beneficial use of water is made....
The effect of the dedication of the waters of state to the state or to
the people confers no ownership of title in the running waters flowing within such respective jurisdiction....

Concluding the "water" phase of its argument, Oregon said this:
A Constitutional and statutory provision dedicating water to the public should be construed as meaning the same as the phrase publici
juris, that the water is a wandering things whose corpus is incapable
of ownership either by the state or the United States, the utmost
right being usufructuary and subject to acquisition by any member
21
of the public first applying in conformity with state regulations.

Oregon's argument is supported by this frequently quoted excerpt
from the California Oregon Power Company decision, which represents
the crux of the argument against the Pelton decision: "What we hold is
that following the [Desert Land] Act of 1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states .... "22 That quoted
excerpt is a reiteration of the sophistry upon which the Colorado Doctrine
is predicated.
As Owner of the "Public Domain" the United States Could Dispose of the
UnappropriatedRights to the Use of Water With the Land or Sever Them
From the Land for Purposes of Disposition
Fundamentally the federal-state conflict in the field of western water
resources, which is exemplified by the controversy over Pelton, is political
in character. It is the natural offspring of our system of dual sovereigns.
Resolution of that struggle may not be possible. Nevertheless, the establishment of the source of title and of the ownership of private rights to
the use of water is crucial if a sensible colloquy in the conflict is to be
conducted.
All doubt is removed that the national government is the source of
23
the title to private rights to the use of water in the desert land states
by this express ruling in the California Oregon Power Company decision:
"As he owner of the public domain, the government possessed the power
to dispose of land and water thereon together, or to dispose of them sep"
arately. Howell v. Johnson [D. Mont. 1898], 89 F. 556, 558. '24
The case of Howell v. Johnson is significant because the court there
expressly considered the source of the rights to the use of water appropriated on public lands in Wyoming. From the above cited page this excerpt
is taken:
The rights of plaintiff do not, therefore, rest upon the laws of Wyoming, but upon the laws of congress. ...
tIbid.
"Supra note 7.
119 Stat. 377 (1877), 43 U.S.C. § 323 (1965)---California, Colorado, Oregon, Nevada,
Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, North Dakota
and South Dakota.
2'Supra note 7, at 162.
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The national government is the proprietor and owner of all the
land in Wyoming and Montana which it has not sold or granted to
some one competent to take and hold the same .... The water in an
innavigable stream flowing over the public domain is a part thereof,
and the national government can sell or grant the same, or the use
thereof, separate from the rest of the estate, under such conditions
as may seem to it proper.
The federal government is not restrained in the disposal of its
lands by state law .... The state governments cannot restrict it in the
primary disposal of its lands.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Montana's Supreme Court adheres to the same principle as that enunciated in Howell v. Johnson:
A water right can therefore be acquired only by the grant, express or
implied, of the owner of the land and water. The right acquired by
appropriation and user of the water on the public domain is founded
in grant from the United States government as owner
of the land and
26
water. Such grant has been made by Congress.
Washington, 2 7 Idaho,

2

8

and California 2 9 have all adopted the concept that

the United States is the source of the title to rights to the use of water.
In view of Oregon's position in the Pelton case it is of interest that
the supreme court of that state has consistently held that an appropriation of rights to the use of water was a grant of rights from the "general
government. ' 30 The measure of Oregon's dilemma in Pelton is delineated
by Justice Sutherland's statement in the California Oregon Power Company decision, alluding to the Oregon Supreme Court case of Hough v.
31
From that decision, these excerpts are taken:
Porter as "well reasoned."

This unquestioned power of the owner [the United States] over the
public domain was exercised and any one entering upon, and acquiring title to, any part of the public domain after the passage of this
act accepted such land and title thereto with full knowledge of the
law under which the patent was issued; the import thereof being that
this right incident to the soil was reserved by the government .... 32
(Emphasis supplied.)
v. Johnson, 89 Fed. 556, 558-59 (D. Mont. 1898).
"Smith v. Denniff, 24 Mont. 20, 21, 60 Pac. 398 (1900). See also Story v. Woolverton,
31 Mont. 346, 353-54, 78 Pac. 589, 590 (1904).
"Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 289, 49 Pac. 495, 499 (1897). "The government,
being the sole proprietor, had the right to permit the water to be taken and diverted
from its riparian lands; .... 1
roLe Quime v. Chambers, 15 Idaho 405, 98 Pac. 415 (1908).
'Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 338, 10 Pac. 674, 721 (1886):

1Howell

It has never been held that the right to appropriate waters on the public lands of the
United States was derived directly from the state of California as the owner of
innavigable streams and their beds; and, since the act of congress granting or recognizing a property in the waters actually diverted and usefully applied on the public
lands of the United States, such rights have always been claimed to be deraigned by
private persons under the act of congress, from the recognition accorded by the act,
or from the acquiescence of the general government in previous appropriations made
with its presumed sanction and approval. (Emphasis supplied.)

'Morgan v. Shaw, 47 Ore. 333, 337, 83 Pac. 534, 535 (1906).
'-Supra note 7, at 160-61.
s251 Ore. 318, 391, 95 Pac. 732, 98 Pac. 1083, 1092 (1908, 1909); 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, 1118 (2d ed. 1912), reiterates that proposition. From this
latter source, at 692-93, this statement is taken:
The Government is still the owner of the surplus of the waters flowing upon the
public domain. . . .It therefore follows, as the result of the ownership by the United
States of the waters flowing upon the public domain, that any dedication by a State
of all the waters flowing within its boundaries to the State or to the public amounts
to but little, in the fact of any claim which may be made by the Government, at least
to all the surplus or unused waters within such State.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/3
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This conclusion must be drawn from the preceding review of the
authorities upon the subject: both the Supreme Court of the United
States and the supreme court of the state which brought about the
ruling in Pelton, recognize that the source of title to privately acquired
rights to the use of water in the desert land states is the national government.

33

Nothing in the Desert Land Act of 1877, or the Acts from Which It
Evolved, Would Support a Conclusion Different from That Expressed
in Pelton
From the express language of the California Oregon Power Company
decision and thc numerous state court decisions which have been cited,
it is evident that the national government had vested title to all of the
rights to the use of water in the streams on the "public lands." The correctness of the Pelton decision turns upon whether the Acts of 1866, 1870,
34
and the Desert Land Act of 1877, resulted in a divestiture of that title.
Specific principles of construction must be followed in the interpretation
of congressional enactments disposing of properties of the federal government.3 5 The exclusive and unlimited power of the Congress over these
properties under the provisions of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the
Constitution is clear. 36 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that:
"The Government, . . .holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all
the people, . . .and officers who have no authority at all to dispose of
Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to
37
lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Acts of 1866 and 1870 lends
support to the concept that the United States has granted away its ownership or the rights to the use of water in the streams rising upon or traversing the public lands. Respecting those Acts, the Supreme Court has
stated that they gave "the sanction of the United States, the proprietor
of the lands, to possessory rights, which had previously rested solely upon
1Omitted are references to
That doctrine is subject to
tion.
"4Act of July 26, 1866, § 9,
Stat. 218, 43 U.S.C. § 661

the states purportedly adhering to the Colorado Doctrine.
special reference in a subsequent portion of this considera14 Stat. 251, 253, and the Act of July 9, 1870, § 16, 16
(1965), provide as follows:

Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural.
manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized

and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors
and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same; ....
All patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed shall be subject to any
vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection

with such water rights, as may have been acquired under or recognized by this section.

The Desert Land Act of 1877, supra note 6, having authorized entry upon desert
lands of the United States, required a declaration under oath that the entryman
"intends to reclaim a tract of desert land.''
'United States v. Utah Power & Light Co., 209 Fed. 554 (8th Cir. 1913); affirmed
243 U.S. 389 (1917).
"United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 (1947).
'United States v. California, supra note 36, at 40. See also, Canmfield v. United States,
167 U.S. 518 (1897).
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The Acts of

1866 and 1877 constitute "no grant of specific rights by the Congress of
39
the United States."
Nor is there anything in the Act of 1877 which would support a conclusion that the national government had stripped itself of title to the
most valuable asset found upon the arid and semiarid public domainrights to the use of water.4 The Act contains no word of grant or dedication. The mere reservation of rights to the use of unappropriated
waters on the "public lands" for the use of the public under the laws of
the states and territories named, cannot be construed as a divestiture of
title. Efforts to expand the limited terminology of the Act of 1877 to
include all of the "public domain," as distinguished from "public land"
open to private acquisition, does violence to the well settled principles
that "statutes granting privileges or relinquishing rights of the public
'4 1
are to be strictly construed against the grantee."
California Oregon Power Company Decision Could Not Decide Issues
Relating to United States Which Were Not Before the Court
Those who decry Pelton as violating principles of the California Oregon Power Company decision ignore the facts of the latter case. There the
litigation was between two private claimants to rights for the use of water
in the Rogue River, a nonnavigable stream. One contestant, a power
company, asserted that a riparian right passed to its predecessor in
interest by a homestead patent issued in 1885, eight years after the Act
of 1877. Challenging that claimed right was a cement company, which
asserted that its rights were based upon permits issued by Oregon's state
engineer. Thus, only claimed private rights were involved. Any doubt
as to the limited scope of the issues is removed by this inquiry presented
by the Supreme Court and the response which it made to the question:
"The question with which we are here primarily concerned is whether
• . the homestead patent in question [issued under the Homestead Act
of 1862, 13 Stat. 35, to the predecessor of the Power Company] carried
with it as part of the granted estate the common-law rights which attach
to riparian proprietorship.

42

Having commented upon the broad language of the Desert Land Act
respecting "surplus water" on the "public lands," the Court made this pro"Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 456-57, 459 (1878).
OUnited States v. Utah Power & Light Co., supra note 35, at 560.

A direct parallel

with the Acts of 1866 and 1870 is found in the mining laws applicable to the public
domain. State and local mining laws were adopted by Congress to prescribe the
method of acquisition of minerals on the properties of the national government.
Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1904). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court held that the United States retained title to the minerals not privately acquired
under the mining law statutes and could exercise its constitutional control over
their disposition. A similar conclusion is unavoidable in regard to the rights to the
use of water which are part and parcel of the "public domain."
'0 See note 7 supra.
"Note 35 supra.
"Supra note 7, at 153-5t

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/3
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nouncement: "It follows that a patent issued thereafter [after the Desert
Land Act] for lands in a desert-land or territory, under any of the land
laws of the United States, carried with it, of its own force, no common law
'43
right to the water flowing through or bordering upon the lands conveyed.
Simply stated, the Court recognized that when Congress authorized acquisition, separate from the land, of appropriative titles to the rights for the
use of water, it necessarily denied to subsequent grantees of the public
land "the common-law right to have the stream continue to flow in its
accustomed channel, without substantial diminution. 4 4 The Supreme
Court was not called upon to reach the basis of the opinion of the court
of appeals, which declared that the states had authority to modify riparian
rights for the general welfare through the exercise of their police power. 45
As a consequence the issues in the California Oregon Power Company decision did not give rise to many of the principles ascribed to it.
The principles set forth in the California Oregon Power Company
decision cannot be applied to the rights of the United States to the use
of water which is part of its "reserved lands," or to the Winters Doctrine
Rights of the Indians. To "try" the title of the national government to
those rights would require that the United States be a party to the action,
and it was not.46 In the Ahtanum case the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit specifically ruled that the rights to the use of water of the United
States could not be decreed in a proceeding to which it was not a party.47
The California Oregon Power Company decision did not relate to the
claimed rights of the United States to the unapproved waters, for a determination of title to those rights "raises questions of law and fact upon
which the United States would have to be heard. ' 48 The declaration by the
Supreme Court in this case that all nonnavigable waters on the public domain became "publici juris" is thus obiter dictum.
The issues presented in the Pelton decision were broader than those
raised in the California Oregon Power Company case. In the latter decision, questions concerning the rights, interests, power and authority of
the United States were directly, and unavoidably presented for resolution.
Not only did Oregon, in the Pelton case, claim title to the rights to the use
of water in the Deschutes River-thus placing at issue title of the national
government to rights held in trust for the Indians and the nation as a
whole-it asserted a veto power over the will of Congress as expressed in
"Id. at 158.
"Id. at 153. Justice Sutherland who spoke for the Court in the California Oregon
Power Company decision, had a formidable task to rationalize the provisions of the
Desert Land Act as being applicable to the Homestead Act of 1862 pursuant to which
the predecessor of the Power Company patented the lands involved. See Argument
for Petitioner, id. at 142.
"Ibid. California did precisely that through its Constitutional amend. XIV, § 3.
"Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 (1939).
"United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1956);
Appellees' cert. denied 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
'Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70, 77 (1908). See also New Mexico v. Lane, 243
U.S. 53 (1917).
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the Federal Power Commission Act. 49 In the opening phase of its "Argument" these statements were made:
[S]aid Desert Land Acts had the effect to sever all waters from the
public domain from the land itself; that the rights, title and interest
in and to all waters of the State, and the right to regulate its use
are vested in the State; that the State of Oregon has refused to
license the proposed [Pelton] project; that under Section 9 b of the
Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C.A. 802 b), the refusal of the State to
approve the project is an absolute bar to the licensing of the project
by the Federal Power Commission." 50
At issue in Pelton was the power of a quasi-sovereign to prevent a sovereign of delegated powers, acting under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, 51 from administering its properties in accordance with the
52
Property Clause of the Constitution.
Pelton Decisions Coalescence of the Severed Titles to Land
and Rights to the Use of Water on Withdrawn Lands
A proper assessment of the Pelton decision must be made in the light
of the legal effect of the Desert Land Act of 1877. This Act was construed by the California Oregon Power Company decision as severing, for
the purposes of private acquisition, the title to the "public lands" from
the title to the unappropriated rights to the use of water; and thus creating two separate estates to be acquired independently of each other.
These two estates are freehold estates in real property.53 This proposition has been accepted in Oregon.5 4 The Supreme Court has also recognized that a head of water in a stream is a property right which, owned
by the United States, may be leased to private concerns; 55 and that "water
power, the right to convert it into electric energy, and the electric energy
thus produced, constitute property belonging to the United States...
Authority to dispose of property constitutionally acquired by the United
States is expressly granted to Congress by Section 3 of Article IV of the
Constitution."5 6 (Emphasis supplied.)
By licensing the Pelton Project, the United States not only granted
a direct flow right to the use of water for the generation of electricity,
but also granted the right to store water for the purpose of increasing
the head. Thus, there is no basis for the statement that "Pelton, an anomoFirst Iowa Hydroelectric Cooperative v. FPO, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
wBrief for Respondents, p. 14, FPC v. Oregon, supra note 1.
"'U.S. CONST. art. VI, (Supremacy Clause): "This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; .... "
52
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, Clause 2 (Property clause): "The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
'
See also, FPC v.
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States;.
Oregon, supra note 1, at 445.
'31 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 298-301 (3rd ed. 1911).
5'OR. REv. STAT. sees. 111.010, 540.510-540.530 (1963). See also supra note 32.
5United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 220 U.S. 53, 73 (1913).
'6Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 330 (1936). See also United
States v.San Francisco, supra note 36.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/3
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aly to water rights law since no water rights were involved in the litigation, brought to the fore the 'reservation' theory. . . . -57 The Supreme
Court recognized that the objective of the Pelton Project was to exercise
the direct flow and storage rights in the Deschutes River. 58
In substance the Supreme Court ruled that a coalescence took place
of the title to the rights to the unappropriated water in the nonnavigable
streams and the title to the soil comprising the "public lands" into a
single estate, which had been severed into two estates by the Desert Land
Act of 1877 when those public lands were withdrawn from the status of
being unqualifiedly subject to sale and disposition because they have
been appropriated (by the United States) to some other purpose. 59 That
merger into a single estate, including both title to the land and title to
the unappropriated rights to the use of water is of immense importance
to the nation. The legal consequence of this declaration is that those rights
to the use of water are no longer subject to private acquisition. This
guarantees that the purpose for which lands are withdrawn may not be
defeated by reason of subsequent private acquisition of rights to the
use of water required in connection with national parks, forests, and
grazing districts.
EFFECT OF PELTON ON THE COLORADO DOCTRINE 60
Overtones of the Colorado Doctrine pervade the opinion of the court
of appeals which Pelton reversed. 61 Throughout the opinion references
are made to "water" as distinguished from rights to their use. Judge
Stephens who wrote the opinion, an expert in the field of western water
law, was well aware of the difference. Yet, he alludes to the alleged right
of Oregon "to regulate its own waters in its own chosen way."'62 Oregon,
in its presentation to the Supreme Court, set forth the very essence of
the Colorado Doctrine:
A constitutional and statutory provision dedicating water to the
public should be construed as meaning the same as the phrase publici
juris, that the water is a wandering thing whose corpus is incapable
of ownership either by the state or the United States, the utmost
5

Federal Water Bights Legislation, supra note 16, at 753.

8F.PC v. Oregon, supra note 1, at 448.
wIbid.
The Colorado Doctrine is evolved from a consideration of the nature of water. 'By
natural law these things are common to all: the air, running water, the sea ...
They are not property. . . .the law regulates the use of it, but the rights of flow
and use are what the law recognizes, and not property in the water itself. The water
itself is 'common' or publici juris." (Emphasis supplied.) Wiel, Theories of Water
Law, 27 HARv. L. REv. 530 (1914).
Thus the Colorado Doctrine holds that all waters of natural streams are held in
common by the public or the state; the common law riparian doctrine is rejected;
the United States has no greater interest in water upon its lands than a private
landowner; the state controls the waters flowing in the streams and can prescribe
the method of acquiring rights in it through appropriation, and no one, including
the United States, may acquire a right to use water other than from the state.
1 WIFEL, op. cit. supra note 53, at 186 et seq.
'Oregon v. FPC, supra note 3, at 353.
121 d. at 354.
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right being usufructuary and subject to acquisition by any member of

the public first applying in conformity with state regulations ...

These principles are in strict conformity with the 1935 decision
California-OregonPower Corn-

of the United States Supreme Court in
pany.... 63

Oregon, by that contention, placed squarely in issue the validity of the
Colorado Doctrine as stated in the obiter dictum of the California Oregon
Power Company decision: "What we hold is that following the Act of
1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public
domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the desig64
nated states ...
With the development of the conflict between the monopolies and
the conservation interests during the first quarter of this century, appeared ardent advocates of the Colorado Doctrine. One of the most competent and respected of those adherents, the late L. Ward Bannister of
Denver, Colorado, urged: "The Colorado-doctrine states disclaim the
riparian system altogether and, accordingly, put forward no theory to
support it. They assert state sovereignty over the waters and then proceed by virtue thereof to declare them subject to disposition by the state
' 5
under the priority system." "
Mr. Bannister rejected the assertions that upon admission to the
Union, title to the unappropriated rights to the use of water passed from
the national government to the states by reason of state constitutional
provisions: "If this be the only theory of supporting a power in the state
to dispose of the waters, only some of the states would have the power,
for only some have constitutional character.""6
Those who espouse state control and ownership of all rights to the
use of water deny that title to rights to the use of water passed to the
United States when the cessions of the lands constituting the "public
domain" were made by France, Spain, Mexico, Great Britain, and the
Indians. The Colorado Doctrine is based on the theory that no one owns
the corpus of the water-that it is publici juris.
Another argument for the Colorado Doctrine is based on an analogy
to the law respecting wild game. It has been said that "running water itself
is not subject to ownership at all;" but is rather "classed with other natural
media . . . air, light, and wild game."' 67 To support the concept that title
to the water resided in Colorado, Mr. Bannister referred to Geer v. Connecticut,"" which involved the control of, rather than the title to game
"'Brief for Respondents, p. 24, FPC v. Oregon, supra note 1.

"Supra note 7, at 163-64, 160-62.
15Bannister, The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters in Priority States,
28 HARv. L. REv. 270, 279 (1915).
"Id. at 283, 287-88. Citing the Colorado Constitution, (COLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5)
Mr. Bannister continued:
Some of the Colorado-doctrine commonwealths, bent on putting the waters as far as
possible beyond the control of the federal government, have adopted constitutional
provisions declaring the waters to be the 'property of the public' or the 'property of
the state.' Even these provisions which are substantially the same in effect are not
considered as vesting the state with any property right in the waters or in their use
but affirming sovereign jurisdiction over them.

wId. at 286.
-161

U.S. 519, 527, 528 (1895).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/3
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birds. He concluded that: "The succession of the state in respect to the
running water was to power, not to property, for the latter the United
States had none." 69
Judge Pope of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the
principles upon which the Colorado Doctrine is predicated in these terms:
[S]uch enactments [claiming state ownership of water] have always
been held to be mere general declarations that the waters within the
State shall be available for acquisition by the people in accordance
with local laws. Such a statutory declaration has no more force or
effect as basis for the establishment of property rights than the
somewhat similar statutory declaration that 7wild
animals and birds
are the property of the people of the State. 0
Wiel's conclusions similarly express the basis and fallacies of the doctrine:
Under the Colorado doctrine, then, it is denied that the United States
has an interest in the waters on its lands as proprietor, and waters
are either owned by the State in trust for the people, or are "publici
juris" owned by no one at all, but free for use by all under State
police power regulation, which protects the first71comer, the prior
appropriator, to the extent of his beneficial use.
The most unfortunate aspect of the Colorado Doctrine is that it was
conceived in the error that the national government should be-indeed,
that it could be-precluded from conducting programs of river development. Because it is based upon a fiction rather than on sound principles
of law, it has led to conflicts which should never have occurred. Many
leaders who honestly believe that the national government has expanded
into fields beyond the scope of the Constitution, are influenced by special
interest groups. These groups would benefit immensely through land
and water monopolies, if the national government could be restricted from
72
developing its lands and unappropriated rights to the use of water.
No one denies that the state police power may be invoked by state
statutes relating to the acquisition and adjudication of private rights to
the use of water. For example, Utah statute provides that: "All waters
in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to
be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use
6Bannister, supra note 65, at 292. In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920),
Justice Holmes rejected the concept of state title to wild birds in these terms:

7

The State as we have intimated found its claim to exclusive authority [as is asserted
in regard to water in the Colorado Doctrine] upon an assertion of title to migratory
birds, an assertion that is embodied in statute. No doubt it is true that as between a
State and its inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of such birds .....
To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are
not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership.
(Emphasis supplied.)

California v. United States, 180 F.2d 596, 608, 609 (1950) (Pope, J., dissenting).
This case demonstrates California's dilemma between its court's recognition of the
national government as the source of title to rights to the use of water, and its
political desire to seize control of all water within its jurisdiction.
7
'WIEL, op. cit. supra note 53, at 199.

"5See dissent, In re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah 2d. 208, 271 P.2d 846 (1954),

which clearly demonstrates the motives of those who would monopolize water on
"reserved lands." For example, the large livestock owner who grazes his stock in
common on the national forest would be a prime beneficiary if his impotent claims
based on state-created rights to the use of water could be declared his private
monopoly under the spurious concept of the Colorado Doctrine. He who controls the
water inby
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thereof. '73 The Supreme Court of Utah has correctly stated: "The statutory declaration. . . .does not vest in the state title or ownership of the
water as a proprietor. It is a community right available to all upon
compliance with the law by which that which was once common to all may
be brought within the domain of private right to use. . .. -,4 (Emphasis
supplied.) The basic proposition declared by Utah's Supreme Court, that
the states in the exercise of their police power may control those subject
to their jurisdiction in regard to water resources, is commonly accepted. 7.
Pelton does not challenge this proper exercise of the states' police
power. Pelton nevertheless strikes down Oregon's effort to seize control
of lands, rights to the use of water, indeed the water itself, flowing across
lands which Congress has set aside for purposes beyond the reach of
state law. A rule different from that enunciated in Pelton would leave
the property of the United States "completely at the mercy of state legislation. "76

To summarize Pelton's effect on the Colorado Doctrine:
(a) It obliterates the key concept of the Colorado Doctrine,
that since the corpus of the water is publici juris, the states have
exclusive control over all waters within their boundaries, and
that the national government is thus relegated to the status of
a private citizen;
(b) It rejects a major premise of the Colorado Doctrine,
that there can be no right to the use of water on the public
domain, including public lands, absent the diversion and use
of water. The logical result of this fallacy of the Colorado
Doctrine would be a reversal of the Winters Doctrine, recently
applied by the Supreme Court as guaranteeing rights on the reserved lands of the national government not only for present
77
but for future uses of water;
(c) It affirms the supremacy of the national government
in regard to "water" and reserved rights to the use thereof;
(d) It leaves a Colorado Doctrine which permits the states
to choose the riparian or appropriative principles which will
govern the private water users. This is the only facet of the
Colorado Doctrine left intact.
3UTAH CODE ANN. 73-1-1 (1953).

"Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P.2d 755, 777 (1935).
'"Eden Irr. Co. v. District Court of Wever County, 61 Utah 103, 211 Pae.

957, 961
(1922); Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. District Court, 42 Nev. 1, 171 Pac. 166,

173-74 (1918) ; Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916); Pitt v.
Scrugham, 44 Nev. 418, 195 Pac. 1101 (1921) ; In re Willow Creek, 74 Ore. 592, 144
Pac. 507; 146 Pac. 475 (1915); Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61

Pac. 258, 260 (1900); Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Tri-State Land Co., 92 Neb. 121, 138

N.W. 171, 179 (1912); Farmers Independent Ditch Co. v. Agricultural Ditch Co.,
22 Colo. 513, 45 Pac. 444, 449 (1896); Farmer's High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v.

Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 134, 21 Pac. 1028, 1031 (1889) ; California Oregon Power
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555, 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1934) affirmed
295 U.S. 142 (1935). See 3 KINNEY, Op. cit. supra note 32, at 2428.
'8Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897).
"Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
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ATTACKS ON PELTON DECISION
HAVE BEEN BASED UPON UNRELATED CASES
Contemporary legal writings frequently argue that Pelton is an
offshoot of the ripirian doctrine;7 8 and that it is destructive of private
rights and state sovereignty. 79 The principal decisions relied upon to
support these arguments will be analyzed in the succeeding paragraphs.
Hawthorne
On repeated occasions those who attack the Pelton decision have
relied upon the Hawthorne case.80 Yet a cursory review of that decision
reveals that it is not related to the precepts of Pelton. Few cases have
had a more innocuous beginning, or a more inglorious ending than
Hawthorne. Naval personnel filed applications with the State Engineer
of Nevada for authority to drill wells to provide small quantities of water
for domestic use on the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot, which
Nevada had ceded to the United States. These wells did not interfere
with any vested rights.8' A filing fee of $6.00 was charged by Nevada.
Navy Headquarters disapproved this expenditure because the Navy need
8 2
not and probably could not comply with the Nevada police regulations.
The Pelton decision at the time had not yet been reported.
Nevada was apparently anxious to utilize the then recently enacted
legislation which would allow the United States to be joined as a defendant
in certain suits for the adjudication of water rights. The Attorney General
of Nevada was a leading spokesman for state's rights in the field of water
law. He had vigorously supported the waiver of the national government's immunity from suit in general adjudication proceedings respecting
rights of that nature8 3 However, Nevada's complaint and the action which
it initiated in the state court to force compliance with Nevada's law was
wholly foreign to the express objective of the above statute.
The action was removed to the federal district court; a brief supporting the position of the United States was filed and that brief was substantially adopted by presiding Judge Ross. The state appealed from
an adverse ruling. Nevada's Judge Merrill, speaking for the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, directed that the case be dismissed because the district
"Federal Water Rights Legislation, supra note 16, at 752; Munro, supra note 18.
"Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill of
1957, 45 CALP'. L. REV. 604 (1957); Goldberg, Interposition--Wild West Style, 17
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1964); Note, Western Water and The Reservation Theory-The
Need for a "Water Rights Settlement Act", 26 MONT. L. REV. 199 (1965).
8°Nevada v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958); dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960). (Hereafter referred to as Hawthorne.)
8id. at 603.
"Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96
(1928).
-43 U.S.C. 666 (1965): waiver of the immunity of the United States from suit in
general adjudication proceedings for the purpose of decreeing rights to the use of
water of a river system or other source of water. See Hearings before Subcommittee
of the Senate
Committee onat
the
Judiciary,ofS.
18, 82d Cong.
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court was without jurisdiction. 4 Hawthorne does not even have the stature
of obiter dictum and is meaningless in regard to the Pelton principles.
Ahtanum
5
in
Extended comment has been directed to the Ahtanum decision"
' 6
There are sharp differences
regard to "federalism" and "riparianism."
on these matters between the opinion of the district court and that of
the court of appeals reversing it." The district court and the appellate
court in the Ahtanum case differed primarily on one basic principle: title
and the source of the title to the rights the use of water involved in the
litigation. This statement by the court of appeals is indicative of that fact:
"Before the treaty [of 1855] the Indians had the right to the use not
only of Ahtanum Creek but of all other streams in a vast area. The Indians
did not surrender any part of their rights to the use of Ahtanum Creek
regardless of whether the Creek became the boundary or whether it flowed
entirely within the reservation." ' 8

s"Nevada v. United States, supra note 80.
"United States v. Ahtanum Irr. District, 124 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wash. 1954).
"OCorker, supra note 79, at 626; Munro, supra note 18, at 246;
Federalism: Failure to analyze the nature of rights to the use of water and to
view them as interests in real property has given rise to charges that Winters,
Pelton and related cases are predicated upon what has been termed federalism. Yet
basically and fundamentally the decisions turn upon sound principles of constitutional
law. Critics of Pelton and the principles it upholds seemingly ignore the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.
Riparianism: Winters Doctrine Rights, as reviewed above, are not in any sense
riparian in character. Veeder, supra note 2, at 161. Certainly the non-Indian successors in interest of Winters Doctrine Rights are not exercising riparian rights.
Moreover, there is no basis whatever for stating that the rights licensed by the United
States for the Pelton project are riparian. The very fact of impoundment of large
quantities of water does violence to riparian principles which do not countenance
cyclic storage. (Seneca Consolidated Gold Mines Co. v. Great Western Power Co.,
209 Cal. 206; 287 Pac. 93 (1930).) There has never been any attempt to force the
riparian or any other doctrine upon the states.
"United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District, 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
Judge Fee, who rendered the district court decision, had presided at the trial
of the California Oregon Power Company case (supra note 7). His decision is not
reported, but differs from the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and the Supreme Court, both of which sustained the ultimate disposition which he
made of it. Judge Fee's views may be summarized in this sentence from Justice
Douglas's lone dissent in Pelton: "I would not suppose the United States could
erect a dam on this nonnavigable river without obtaining its water rights in accord(349 U.S. 435, 452.)
ance with state law."
Judge Pope who wrote the Ahtanum decision for the court of Appeals [236 F.2d
321 (1956); 330 F.2d 397 (1964); 338 F.2d 307 (1964)] had a broad background
in regard to indian rights to the use of water as counsel for the Flathead Irrigation
District, on the Flathead Indian Reservation. See United States v. McIntyre, 101
F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939).
The refusal of Judge Fee to recognize that Winters Doctrine Rights are different
from riparian and appropriative rights, points to one of the basic reasons for disputes
in regard to Pelton. It was argued by the United States to the trial court that
Winters Doctrine Rights are neither riparian nor appropriative in character. Rather,
it was urged the title to the rights to the use of water in Ahtanum Creek, retained
by the Yakima Indians in their Treaty of 1855 is free from the limitations imposed
by state statutes or the common law. For the difference between Winters Doctrine
Rights, riparian rights and appropriative rights see Veeder, supra note 2, at 160
et seq.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/3
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Pelton and Ahtanum have this in common: In both cases the courts
which were reversed departed from sound legal principles and rendered
opinions based upon the concepts of the Colorado Doctrine. These lower
courts expressed precisely the same rationale. Judge Fee, writing for
the district court in Ahtanum, ruled against the United States because
"the claims of the United States impinge upon the sovereignty of the State
of Washington."8 9 Judge Stephens, for the Court of Appeals in Pelton,
declared: "Oregon has the right to regulate its own water in its own chosen
way."90 Pelton was relied upon to dispose of the lower court's decision in
the Ahtanum case: "Rights reserved by treaties such as this are not subject to appropriation under state law, nor has the state power to dispose
of them." 91
Fallbrook
Citing Fallbrook 92 for authority, this statement has been made under
the heading of "The 'public lands' question in the appropriation states":
"In jurisdictions following the riparian doctrine, the United States generally possesses a water right no greater than those of other riparian
owners and as such does not limit private uses."'93 The statement is based
upon a misconception. The issues involved in Fallbrook do not relate to
"public lands." Rather, those issues pertain exclusively to riparian rights,
condemned by the United States for a naval enclave. Obviously the United
States can claim no greater riparian rights than those owned by its private
predecessor in interest.9 4 Under no circumstances should Winters Doctrine
Rights be confused with riparian rights, the title to which has been purchased from a private owner by the national government. Even though
the Fallbrook Public v. Utility District did not contest the Federal Winters
Doctrine Rights, nevertheless, the judgment entered May 8, 1963, in the
second Fallbrook trial decreed Winters Doctrine Rights to the Indian
reservations, national forests and national grazing districts situated in
the Santa Margarita River watershed above the naval enclave. Those
rights, it is to be noted, were adjudicated for any beneficial use.
Fallbrook has likewise been cited in connection with an assertion that
the United States has complied with state law for the purpose of acquiring
0124 F. Supp. 818, 824 (1952).
"Supra note 3, at 354.
-236 F.2d 321, 328 (1956).
"United States v. Fallbrook Public Utility District, 101 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
108 F. Supp. 72 (1952); 109 F. Supp. 28 (1952); 110 F. Supp. 767 (1953); 202
F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1953); 165 F. Supp. 806 (1958); 193 F. Supp. 342 (1961);
Reversed in part and affirmed in part, 347 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1965). This case is
the subject of a broad review, now in preparation, from the standpoint of political,
economic, and legal inquiry, not involved in the present consideration. Noteworthy
is the fact, however, that on May 8, 1963, a final judgment was entered decreeing,
in effect, every right and interest of Fallbrook Public Utility District subject and
subordinate to the prior rights of the United States.
"Federal Water Rights Legislation, supra note 16, at 758.
"United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1949).
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rights to the use of water.9 5 However, the United States was making no
claim-in regard to the rights then under discussion by the court-which
involved "public land" or Winters Doctrine Rights. Rather, the rights
involved had been condemned from a private corporation.9"
City and County of Denver Litigation
The City and County of Denver case 97 is a frequently cited basis for
attack upon the Pelton decision. In the Denver case the Supreme Court
of Colorado relied heavily upon the precepts of the Colorado Doctrine in
what appears to be a ruling against the position of the United States.
Like Hawthorne, however, the facts involved are so far removed from those
of Pelton that it is clearly incorrect to mention Denver in any discussion of
the federal-state conflict. 98 Briefly the facts are these: Because the immunity of the federal government from suit deprived the local court of
jurisdiction, the United States which had originally filed in the state
court, withdrew its pleadings from that court and initiated a new action
in the federal court. An appeal was nevertheless taken to the Supreme
Court of Colorado by Denver, purportedly against the United States.
This anomaly then developed: Denver served the United States and
attempted to join it in the appeal. A motion to dismiss the appeal as
to the national government was granted, and Denver lost on the issues
before the Colorado Supreme Court. Nevertheless, that court rendered
an opinion attempting to enforce the substance of the Colorado Doctrine
against the United States even though it was not a party to he case. 99
Ultimately Denver conceded the better rights of the national government
and the matter was concluded by a decree entered several months after
the Pelton decision. 10 0 Thus, like Howthorne, the decision of Colorado's
Supreme Court in the City and County of Denver is obiter dictum.
Pelton As It Relates to the "Reservation Theory"
The "Reservation theory"' 0 1 is based upon several misconceptions. As
the term has been used it fails to take cognizance of the fact that the
title exercised by the Indians in Winters and Ahtanum never resided in
a Water Rights Settlement Act, supra note 79, at 214-15.
"The matter of compliance by the national government with state law for the acquisition of water rights is beyond the scope of this consideration. The issue does, however, raise many questions. For example: any right acquired under California law
(See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1629-1631) is subject to being condemned by a public
authority after twenty years. If the United States complied with California lawassuming it could, which is denied-could the national purpose be frustrated by such
a law? Efforts to force compliance by the United States with the laws of a quasisovereign must first overcome fundamental constitutional barriers.
"City and County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Con. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d
992 (1954).
"See irrelevant discussion of the Pelton principles in connection with Denver, Munro,
supra note 18, at 248-49.
"City and County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Con. Dist., supra note 97.
1
"Final decree, United States v. City and County of Denver, October 12, 1955:
"Western Water and the Reservation Theory---The Need for
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the national government. Those rights were retained by the Indians and
have been appropriately referred to as "immemorial rights." 10 2 Thus, they
were not "reserved" by the United States and were never subject to the
Acts of 1866, 1870, or the Desert Land Act of 1877.103
A wholly different factual situation prevails in regard to the rights
05
involved in the Walker River decision1 0 4 and in Arizona v. California.'
In the strict sense of the word those rights were not "reserved." Rather,
upon withdrawal they simply were no longer available for private acquisition. Because of the broad power of the national government over its
property, those rights can be used by it for any purpose now and in the
future and their use is not limited to the purpose for which they were
withdrawn. Pelton provides clear authority for that proposition.
CONCLUSION
Pelton's prime importance may be summarized in these terms: It
applied the constitutional safeguards, adhered to in all other areas of
federal-state relations, to the field of water conservation and utilization,
and protects Winters Doctrine Rights. The need to preserve the principles
declared by-Pelton is manifest to anyone acquainted with the present plans
and problems of Western United States. Repeated efforts to legislate the
Pelton decision out of existence have failed primarily because of the grave
damage to the country which would follow such an abrogation. 0 6

"'Federal Water Rights Legislation, supra note 16, at 753.
1"'United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., D. Ariz., unreported; generally referred
to as Globe Equity No. 59.
'Supra notes 6 and 34; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878).
104104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
"-373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
"'Need For An Inventory-Nevada's late Senator Pat McCarran many years ago
recognized that the United States must determine the need and availability of water
upon its public and reserved lands and the measure of those rights. Accordingly he
proposed legislation authorifing an inventory of those rights. Though the provision
in question did not become law, the need for it continues today as the attacks upon
the Pelton decision continue. S. 18, 82nd Congress, Report No. 755, September 17,
1951, Sections 2 and 3.
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